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Mismeasured mortality: correcting estimates of wolf poaching in
the United States
Adrian Treves,* Kyle A. Artelle, Chris T. Darimont, and David R. Parsons

* Correspondent: atreves@wisc.edu
Measuring rates and causes of mortalities is important in animal ecology and management. Observing the fates
of known individuals is a common method of estimating life history variables, including mortality patterns. It has
long been assumed that data lost when known animals disappear were unbiased. We test and reject this assumption
under conditions common to most, if not all, studies using marked animals. We illustrate the bias for 4 endangered
wolf populations in the United States by reanalyzing data and assumptions about the known and unknown fates of
marked wolves to calculate the degree to which risks of different causes of death were mismeasured. We find that,
when using traditional methods, the relative risk of mortality from legal killing measured as a proportion of all
known fates was overestimated by 0.05–0.16 and the relative risk of poaching was underestimated by 0.17–0.44.
We show that published government estimates are affected by these biases and, importantly, are underestimating the
risk of poaching. The underestimates have obscured the magnitude of poaching as the major threat to endangered
wolf populations. We offer methods to correct estimates of mortality risk for marked animals of any taxon and
describe the conditions under which traditional methods produce more or less bias. We also show how correcting
past and future estimates of mortality parameters can address uncertainty about wildlife populations and increase
the predictability and sustainability of wildlife management interventions.
Key words: carnivore, endangered species, illegal, lethal control, mark–recapture, regulated take

An accurate understanding of causes of death in animal populations is important for effective management and legitimate
policy. Contemporary study of wild animal populations has
benefited enormously from mark–recapture methods to estimate life history variables, such as mortality. However, marked
animals in such studies sometimes elude recapture, which leads
to loss of data (i.e., unknown fates). When the proportion of
unknown fates among marked animals is low, the potentially
biasing effects of data loss might be correspondingly low. Also,
when the mortality risks for unknown fates are very similar
to those for known fates, the loss of data should not bias the
estimates of life history traits (i.e., this would be “uninformative censoring”). The traditional presumptions in most studies
are that marked animals disappear because they moved out of

range of telemetry or the transmitter technology affixed to the
animal failed, but otherwise researchers assume the life and
death of those animals proceeded as it would otherwise have
done. We examine this assumption for wolves (Canis lupus and
C. rufus) in the United States, and emerge with a generalizable
insight broadly applicable to many taxa.
Although early research on grizzly bears (Ursus arctos)
suggested data loss was biased when humans destroyed radiotransmitters (McLellan et al. 1999), this idea was not quantified for gray wolves (C. lupus) until study of the mortality and
poaching of Scandinavian wolves (Liberg et al. 2012). When
Adams et al. (2008) documented that 74% of human-caused
deaths went unreported in an Alaskan gray wolf population,
even that high rate of loss of data on wolves did not raise
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animals might be influenced by whether humans can detect collars and are killing wolves legally. A study in Wisconsin, across
a landscape with denser human activity including many roads,
people, livestock, hunters, hounds, etc., produced an estimated
28% higher mortality rate for unmarked gray wolves than for
marked wolves when illegal killing comprised almost half of all
deaths (Treves et al. 2017b). Despite current uncertainty about
why marked or unmarked wolves face different rates of mortality from humans in different systems, all these studies converge
to suggest that the traditional assumption is unsupported: fates
of marked wolves do not seem to accurately represent the risk
and rates of mortality for the broader population.
Based on the above, we test whether unknown fates of
marked wolves cause important losses of information that
would bias results. We also test the specific hypothesis that
poaching is systematically underestimated when data from
wolves of unknown fates are omitted. We reanalyzed data
from 4 populations of wolves in the United States (2 populations of gray wolves, C. lupus; 1 population of Mexican gray
wolves, C. l. baileyi; and 1 population of red wolves, C. rufus).
Although our results are specific to wolves, we identify a general mechanism that applies to studies of other species whose
mortality can be divided into deaths where the cause is known
and deaths where the cause is unknown.

Materials and Methods
We define legal killing to include regulated harvest or government removal of a protected animal, as long as the death was
reported after a permitted activity. We define poaching as any
non-permitted killing in which the actor intended to kill an
animal (trapping, poison, shooting, etc.), as opposed to most
vehicle collisions in which the driver likely does not intend to
kill any animal. This definition of poaching is justified under
the Endangered Species Act because the U.S. Congress of
1973 explicitly made it illegal to kill a listed species regardless of “knowingly” doing so (Newcomer et al. 2011). Also,
we redefine “known fates” and “unknown fates” from their
common usage for marked animals. We define known fate as
any marked animal whose cause of death is confirmed (i.e.,
excluding marked animals whose remains are recovered but are
assigned to “unknown cause” of death, and excluding marked
animals that disappear). Importantly, we differ from several
other authorities by highlighting that “unknown cause” of death
never includes legal killing (because, by definition, a legal kill
must be reported so its cause is known). Finally, many studies of marked animals have to contend with the possibility that
a marked animal that disappeared is still alive but has eluded
monitoring. We avoid this difficulty for all 4 populations under
analysis by restricting ourselves to older time periods, so radiocollared wolves could not still be alive today.
Section 1: calculating the bias in mortality estimates.—We
begin with the mathematics underlying estimation of risk of
mortality, defined as the proportion of all deaths attributable
to a given cause. The traditional assumption was that data lost
from unknown fates was uninformative, because the marked
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concerns, perhaps because unreported killing seemed inconsequential to a large, resilient wolf population. Later, parallel
analyses of Northern Rocky Mountain (NRM) gray wolves
appeared to accept the assumption of uninformative censoring
(Murray et al. 2010). They cited unpublished analyses showing
that including dead radiocollared wolves for which cause of
death could not be inferred did not produce “qualitatively different results” (Murray et al. 2010:2517). Those unpublished
analyses of recovered marked wolves whose cause of death was
unknown are not peer-reviewed as of the time of writing. That
same year, some of the same authors published another mortality analysis (Smith et al. 2010), in which they inferred that
some marked wolves of unknown fates dispersed and eluded
telemetry, because the proportion of suspected dispersers that
disappeared (31.4%) differed from the proportion (18.1%) of
known residents that disappeared. High-altitude aerial telemetry conducted intensively across the recovery areas was oriented to locating dispersers because of the importance of such
events (Bangs and Fritts 1996). Smith et al. (2010) analyzed the
last known locations prior to disappearances to infer that modestly informative censoring was present and the locations of
disappearance were not in areas of high human activity, therefore “associated principally with dispersal status rather than
human-caused mortality” (Smith et al. 2010:632). That inference hinges on the hypothesis that levels of poaching would be
higher in areas of higher human activity. However, we suggest
that strict protection of wolves might alternatively have made
people reluctant to kill a wolf where the likelihood of witnesses
seemed higher. If so, locations more prone to poaching might
instead include more remote areas. Remote hunting zones might
reasonably be implicated given that recent research on inclination to poach indeed implicates hunters in both the NRM and
in the state of Wisconsin (Treves and Martin 2011; Treves et al.
2013; Treves et al. 2017a). After Liberg et al. (2012), attention
to poaching grew in the wolf research community.
Studying Scandinavian gray wolves, researchers estimated
the major cause of death was poaching, which accounted for
51% of all mortality (poaching risk). An estimated 66% of that
poaching went unreported (Liberg et al. 2012). Because the
study reconstructed the fates of poached wolves that went missing, it drew attention to—and undermined—the previously held
assumptions that a small proportion of marked animals disappeared and that data loss was minimal. It also raised questions
about the assumption that unknown fates resembled known
fates in mortality risk and rate (i.e., censoring was informative in the Scandinavian study). Further evidence of a problem
with the latter assumption followed reanalysis of data from
Adams et al. (2008), working in the Brooks Range of Central
Alaska. Schmidt et al. (2015) reported at least 15% higher mortality among unmarked gray wolves compared to their marked
pack-mates. In contrast, another Alaskan study around Denali
National Park and Preserve reported that marked wolves suffered
higher rates of regulated killing (Borg et al. 2016). These study
sites in Alaska, however, differed. The former had few roads,
and few people, whereas the latter had more of both suggesting
that the relative risk from humans for marked and unmarked
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large the inaccuracy might be. We use the method in Table 1A
to estimate how much the risk of legal killing has been overestimated in its proportional contribution to total mortality in
endangered wolves.
As legal killing increases, the bias caused by discarding
information on unknown fates increases (Fig. 1B). As the number of unknown fates (m) increases, so too does the bias. The
bias increases proportionally to both legal kills and m because
each additional individual of unknown fate results in increased
underestimation of inaccurately documented causes, whereas
each additional legal kill results in increased overestimation
of the contribution of legal kills. By accounting fully for all
marked animals (n + m) and by estimating the unknown variables (Figs. 2A and 2B; Table 1B), we extract more information
from the sample of marked animals than done traditionally. The
arithmetic described in Table 1A and Fig. 1 is a mathematical fact. But we can extract yet more information from welldocumented cases if we split the causes of death as in Table 1B
and consider the role of P, which estimates cryptic poaching.

Fig. 1.—Systematic bias in calculating the risk of mortality from legal killing when some marked animals have unknown fates (unobservable with
question marks ?) and causes of death vary in the accuracy of documentation. The green squares represent legal kills (perfectly documented) and
the blue squares denote other causes of death (inaccurately documented). Observed (silhouette with binoculars) known fates (check marks ✓, and
calculation in red text) alone would overestimate the real risk of legal killing. A) Positive bias in estimating risk of legal killing is 0.16. B) Positive
bias increases by 0.17 as the proportion of legal kills increases.
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animals with known fates ostensibly represented all marked
animals’ fates. This assumed the relative risks of different
causes of death were approximately equivalent in marked animals of known and unknown fates. However, marked animals
of unknown fate never die from perfectly documented causes,
such as legal killing, or they would not have disappeared.
Therefore, the animals of known fate cannot represent the animals of unknown fate accurately (Fig. 1A).
The mismatch between animals of known fate and those of
unknown fate introduces error that is not random but systematic
(biasing). The error is always in the direction of underestimating the risk posed by inaccurately documented causes of death
because these sometimes lead to unknown fates. Conversely,
overestimation of risks of the perfectly documented causes of
death (e.g., legal killing in our context) occurs because these
causes are not represented among the unknown fates at all.
Therefore, the traditional assumption that marked animals of
known fate represent fates of all marked animals is inaccurate
as a mathematical fact. The only question that remains is how
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Table 1.—Estimating the relative risk of mortality as a proportion of marked animals, when marked animals disappear (unknown fates). A)
Equal numbers of known and unknown fates, 1 perfectly documented cause of death (legal killing) and 1 inaccurately documented cause of death.
B) The general expression for any n known fates and m unknown fates with 3 causes of death. Prior values are precise and accurate for n (number
of known fates), m (number of unknown fates), Legal (number of marked animals killed legally), Observednon (number of marked animals of
known fate that died from nonhuman causes), Observedoh (number of marked animals of known fate that died from human causes other than legal
killing), and Expectednon + Expectedoh (the number of marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from nonhuman and other human causes,
respectively) sum to m but have uncertain values. Unknown fates include recovered carcasses with unknown cause of death. P is the number of
marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from cryptic poaching following equation 2.
Causes of death
Perfectly documented legal killing
Inaccurately documented causes
B)
Legal killing
Nonhuman causes
Other human causes

Mortality risk for marked animals
Known fates (50)

Unknown fates (50)

Known + unknown fates (100)

0.20
0.80

0
1.00

0.10
0.90

Known fates (n)

Unknown fates (m)

Known + unknown fates (n + m)

Legal/n
Observednon/n
Observedoh/n

0
Expectednon/m
(Expectedoh + P)/m

Legal/(n + m)
(Observednon + Expectednon)/(n + m)
(Observedoh + Expectedoh + P)/(n + m)

a

a

Legal kills must be reported (all known fates) or they are not legal.

a

Our approach is more efficient because additional information
is acquired from the sample of marked individuals.
Section 2: estimating unknown fates.—A failure to document death of a marked animal can occur because poachers concealed evidence or because the marked animal eluded
monitoring prior to death (Supplementary Data SD1). Eluding
monitoring prior to death means a marked animal lived for a
time and then died undocumented—at least undocumented by
the same method used on marked animals of known fate. It
might be reasonable to assume such marked animals are represented well by the known fates, because eluding monitoring
does not necessarily imply systematic change in risk. However,
if poachers destroy evidence before or soon after killing a
marked animal, then the situation changes entirely. We refer to
these occasions as “cryptic poaching.” Destruction of evidence
is rarely, if ever, associated with nonhuman causes of death. We
examine the many factors that may lead to an unknown fate in
Supplementary Data SD1, but in the section below, we focus
on cryptic poaching. We treat cryptic poaching as an event with
estimable frequency. Attempting to estimate the causes of death
of the unknown fates can be important if poachers commonly
destroy evidence or poaching is common. Therefore, we present approaches to confront that challenge in estimation.
First, we consider and reject 2 extreme approaches to estimating the expected values in Table 1B and P for cryptic poaching. By rejecting the extreme approaches, we clarify the more
credible intervals around the values of interest. One extreme
approach inspired by cryptic poaching might be to apportion all
the unknown fates to other human causes in Table 1B and none
to nonhuman causes, assuming that unknown fates only arise
from a human destroying evidence. That approach certainly
exaggerates poaching, because technology failure, and marked
animals that elude monitoring but later die of nonhuman causes,
can lead to some disappearances (Supplementary Data SD1).
Likewise, the alternative extreme would apportion all unknown
fates to nonhuman causes and none to other human causes.
That assumption requires more evidence to reject, which we
present in Supplementary Data SD1. Nevertheless, the extreme

(no cryptic poaching) is illogical by our definition of an animal
that eludes monitoring. That some marked animals live and die
unmonitored is likely, but eluding monitoring does not immunize animals from poaching unless all poachers avoid marked
animals. That seems infeasible if traps, poison, or shooting
under conditions of low visibility occur. Therefore, the second
extreme approach is also unrealistic. We assume cryptic poaching occurs and we present 2 reasonable approaches to estimate
the expected values in Table 1B.
One reasonable approach to estimate cryptic poaching would
be to estimate Expectednon (the number of marked animals of
unknown fate expected to die from nonhuman causes) and
Expectedoh + P (the number of marked animals of unknown
fate expected to die from other human causes) by their relative proportions in the known fates, but importantly, excluding legal kills from that calculation. This “equal apportionment
approach” perpetuates the assumption that known fates can be
extrapolated to unknown fates without further correction than
performed in Table 1A. Equal apportionment is appropriate to
situations in which 3 criteria are met: 1) marked animals were
selected randomly from the population as a whole, 2) marked
animals disappear without regard to the cause of death, and
3) the researchers have evidence that marking and monitoring
do not affect risk of different causes of death. We predict these
conditions will never be met for controversial wildlife, such as
wolves, but we provide the approach for other species and for
Bayesian modelers who wish to define informative credible
intervals. Figure 2A depicts the equal apportionment approach.
If cryptic poaching is non-zero, then poached animals should
be deducted from m before equal apportionment occurs, because
poachers interrupted monitoring. Cryptic poaching alters estimates of mortality risk because data are lost; more so as concealment behavior spreads or becomes more effective. We have 2
published estimates of cryptic poaching rates to draw upon. For
Scandinavian wolves, the cryptic poaching rate was estimated
at 66% of total poaching, suggesting that for each observed
poached wolf, 2 poached wolves eluded observation (Liberg
et al. 2012). For Wisconsin wolves, the corresponding estimate
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was 46–54% of total poaching (Treves et al. 2017b), or for each
observed poached wolf, 1 poached wolf eluded observation
(Fig. 2B). In Supplementary Data SD1, we explain why the
Wisconsin estimate is conservative. In brief, it treats poaching
that was known as if there was no attempt at cryptic poaching.
Estimates of cryptic poaching are probably landscape-specific
and perhaps specific to certain years because they may reflect
accessibility to habitat, human attitudes toward current policy,
reporting animal deaths, etc. To isolate poaching from other
human causes of death for Figs. 2B and 3, we accepted the official estimates of known-fate poaching and vehicle collisions
and applied their ratio to our estimates of other human causes
in Table 1B (see Supplementary Data SD2 for the raw data).
Then, we used 2 equations to estimate the numbers of marked

animals of unknown fates expected to die from nonhuman causes
and other human causes respectively, as follows:
Expected non = (m - P ) · Observednon / (Observednon + Observedoh )(1a)
Expectedoh = (m - P ) · Observedoh / (Observednon + Observedoh )(1b)

where n and m are defined above and in Table 1A, Legal is
the number of marked animals killed legally, Observednon is the
number of marked animals of known fate that died from nonhuman causes, Observedoh is the number of marked animals of
known fate that died from human causes other than legal killing, and P is defined by equation 2:

		P = Poachedo • C (2)
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Fig. 2.—Systematic bias in estimating the risk of mortality when some marked animals have unknown fates (unobservable, question marks ?) and
causes of death vary in the accuracy of documentation. Observed (silhouette with binoculars) known fates (check marks ✓) alone would underestimate the inaccurately documented causes of death (unknown fates, white, black, and blue squares). Two approaches to estimating unknown fates
produce lower and upper bounds on estimates of risk of mortality, using equations 1a, 1b, and 2. A) The equal apportionment approach assumes that
the observed ratio of known nonhuman causes of death (white squares with check marks) to known, other human causes of death (black squares with
check marks) applies to the unknown fates (squares with approximately equal signs, ≈). B) The cryptic poaching approach with C = 2 from equation 2
assumes that for every 1 known-fate poached animal (black square with check mark) there will be 2 unknown-fate poached animals (black square with
≈), which must be accounted first before equal apportionment of the remainder adds 1 poached and 1 nonhuman cause of death (white square with ≈).
This approach requires discrimination between poaching and vehicle collision or other unintentional human causes (see Supplementary Data SD2).
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where Poachedo is the number of marked animals of known
fate that died from poaching and C is the scalar of cryptic
poaching, which we assigned the values of 0 (equal apportionment), 1 (Wisconsin estimate), or 2 (Scandinavian estimate) as
explained above.

Results
Section 1: overestimating risk for perfectly documented
causes of death.—Estimating relative risk of mortality from
legal causes using only the known fates produced estimates
that were 0.05–0.16 higher than when unknown fates were
included (Table 2). Published estimates of the risk of legal killing also tend to be higher than ours in Table 2. For Wisconsin
wolves, Stenglein et al. (2015) reported 0.125 risk for “Legal”
(their Table 2), which was 0.063 higher than our estimate for
the same period. For NRM wolves, Smith et al. (2010) reported
0.30 risk of mortality from “legal causes,” which is 0.06 higher
than our estimate of the risk of mortality from legal causes for
the same period. Disparities were not so clear for Mexican and

red wolves. Because the USFWS reported mortality risk for
Mexican wolves after excluding most legal causes (USFWS
2016c), their proportions are not directly comparable to ours.
For red wolves, the USFWS and (Murray et al. 2015) estimated
risk as we did (USFWS 2007) citing Murray unpublished.
However, disparities between the 2 reports for red wolves could
not be reconciled so we used the median which was 0.05 higher
than our estimate in Table 2. The overestimates of legal killing
in Table 2 increased from 0.05 to 0.16 as the risk of legal killing
rose (Fig. 1B).
Section 2: underestimating risk for inaccurately documented
causes of death.—Complementary to overestimates of legal
killing, estimates of the relative risk of other human-caused
mortality using known fates produced lower estimates than
when unknown fates were included (Figs. 2A and 2B; Table 3).
Official estimates of other human causes of mortality for
Wisconsin wolves (Natural Resources Board 2012; Stenglein
et al. 2015) were 0.17–0.36 lower than ours in Table 3. The official estimates of risk of mortality from other human causes for
NRM wolves from Murray et al. (2010) and Smith et al. (2010)
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Fig. 3.—Endangered wolves (gray: Canis lupus, Mexican gray: C. l. baileyi, and red: C. rufus) and risk of mortality from poaching as a proportion
of all deaths. Approximate geographic locations are shown for 4 populations in the United States. The relative risks of mortality from poaching
by government estimates (dark gray bars, no uncertainty estimates available) are paired with the same estimates from this study (light gray bars;
error bars: lower bound derived from the equal apportionment approach and upper bound derived from the Scandinavian estimate of cryptic
poaching C = 2). See Supplementary Data SD2 for poaching values separated from other human causes: Wisconsin (Natural Resources Board
2012); Northern Rocky Mountain (NRM): (Murray et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2010); Mexican: (USFWS 2015: table 4); red (USFWS 2007: figure 7).
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Table 2.—Relative risk of mortality from legal killing, as a proportion of all radiocollared wolves (Canis lupus or C. rufus) that had known
fates or unknown fates (disappeared or unknown cause of death) for 4 wolf populations with n (number of known fates), m (number of unknown
fates), and Legal (number of marked animals killed legally). NRM = Northern Rocky Mountains.
Populationa

Known fates (n)

Unknown fates (m)b

Known + unknown fates (n + m)b

0.12
0.40
0.33
0.13

0
0
0
0

0.06
0.24
0.25
0.08

Wisconsin gray
NRM gray
Mexican gray
Red

Table 3.—Relative risk of mortality from inaccurately documented causes of death, as a proportion of all radiocollared wolves (Canis lupus
or C. rufus) that had known fates or unknown fates (disappeared or unknown cause of death) for 4 wolf populations: n (number of known fates),
m (number of unknown fates), Observedoh (number of marked animals of known fate that died from human causes other than legal killing),
Expectedoh (the number of marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from other human causes), C is the cryptic poaching scalar of 0, 1, or
2, and P is the number of marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from cryptic poaching following equation 2. NRM = Northern Rocky
Mountains.
Populations and estimation approaches (C)a
Wisconsin equal apportionment (0)
Wisconsin cryptic poaching (1, 2)
NRM equal apportionment (0)
NRM cryptic poaching (1, 2)
Mexican equal apportionment (0)
Mexican cryptic poaching (1, 2)
Red equal apportionment (0)
Red cryptic poaching (1, 2)

Observedoh/n

(Expectedoh + P)/m

Weighted average

0.57
0.57
0.37
0.37
0.52
0.52
0.65
0.65

0.65
0.80, 0.95
0.61
0.77, 0.94
0.77
1.05, 1.33d
0.74
0.94, 1.13d

0.60
0.68, 0.75
0.46
0.53, 0.59
0.59
0.66, 0.73
0.68
0.75, 0.82

a
Sources are identical to Table 2 and raw data are found in Supplementary Data SD2. We used the median of the 2 red wolf values: Poachedo = 45 (“Private Trap,”
“Poison,” “Gunshot”b) or 39 (“Gunshot,” “illegal”c), Observedoh = 23 for both sourcesb,c, comprising 0.76b or 0.72c of n − Legal = 90b or 86c, as the number of
marked animals killed legally.
b
USFWS (2007).
c
Murray et al. (2015).
d
Values exceeding 1.0 arose when equation 2 yielded a higher value than m.

were 0.14–0.27 lower than ours in Table 3. The official estimate of risk of mortality from other human causes for Mexican
wolves was 0.07–0.21 lower than ours in Table 3, when calculated with all deaths and permanent removals (USFWS 2016c).
The median of the 2 estimates of risk of mortality from other
human causes for red wolves was 0.26–0.40 lower than ours
in Table 3. Even with the conservative equal apportionment
approach, our ranges of estimates all fall above official point
estimates made by agencies and biologists.
Poaching in particular has been underestimated systematically by biologists and policy makers (Fig. 3). In Fig. 3, we
present the official estimates of poaching for 4 endangered wolf
populations in the United States, compared to our range of estimates from Table 3 and Supplementary Data SD2. Using the
Wisconsin estimate of cryptic poaching (50%), our estimates
of risk of mortality from poaching are 0.17–0.32 higher than
official estimates of the risk of mortality from poaching. The
Scandinavian estimate of cryptic poaching (66%) yielded estimates of risk of mortality from poaching that are 0.32–0.45
higher than official estimates of the risk of mortality from

poaching. The Wisconsin estimate of cryptic poaching lies near,
but slightly higher, than the median between the equal apportionment lower bound (Fig. 2A) and the Scandinavian cryptic
poaching upper bound (Fig. 2B), which suggests slightly asymmetrical credible intervals because of negative skew.
Supplementary Data SD3 presents our estimates of risk of
mortality for 3 causes of death (see Supplementary Data SD2).
Poaching was the major cause of death for the 4 endangered
wolf populations.

Discussion
The relative risks of different causes of death for marked animals have often been miscalculated under 1 or both of the following common conditions: 1 or more causes of death were
perfectly reported but others were not, or marked animals had
unknown fates (i.e., disappeared without a trace or were recovered but the cause of death was undetermined). The resulting bias overestimates the perfectly reported causes of death,
such as legal killing, and underestimates the others, such as
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Wisconsin 1979–2012 n = 221, m = 210, Legal = 27 (Treves et al. 2017b) from their Table 2; NRM 1982–2004 n = 320, m = 206, Legal = 128 (Murray et al.
2010) from their Table 2; Mexican 1998–2015 n = 155, m = 53 (8 unknown, 6 awaiting necropsy, 39 lost signals), Legal = 51 (including permanent removals, and
“Other causes of death include capture-related mortalities and legal shootings by the public”), from USFWS (2015); Siminski (2016); USFWS (2016a, 2016c,
2016b, 2016d); North Carolina red wolves 1999–2007 n = 111, m = 55, Legal = 22 “management” (USFWS 2007) citing Murray, unpublished; however, Murray
et al. (2015) reported n = 91, m = 58, Legal = 5. We report the median of the 2 red wolf values.
b
Because legal kills must be reported (known fates) or they are not legal, the corrected risk of legal killing followed the method in Table 1A and Fig. 1A.
a
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underrepresenting inaccurately documented causes of death,
respectively). By accounting fully for all marked animals and
by estimating the unknown fates, we can extract more information from the sample of marked animals than has been done
traditionally. Extracting more information is desirable from the
standpoint of management efficiency (less effort to mark animals is wasted when data are lost) and also for accuracy.
Some authorities will dismiss relative risk estimates as irrelevant for populations perceived to be large, growing, and resilient. Such a dismissal might be biologically inappropriate. Three
studies of gray wolves, 1 in Wisconsin and 2 separate populations in Alaska (Schmidt et al. 2015; Borg et al. 2016; Treves
et al. 2017b), demonstrate that mortality rates (per capita hazard) for marked wolves were as different as 15–28% from the
per capita hazard rate for unmarked wolves. A mechanistic link
between mismeasured risk and unrepresentative hazard rates
for marked animals might exist. For example, it might relate
to the methods used in recent years to mark wolves, such as
livetrapping in areas where few people spend time or livetrapping in core areas of established wolf pack territories, both of
which may capture individuals with lower exposure to humancaused mortality (Treves et al. 2017b). Alternatively, hunters
and poachers may be able to target (or avoid) marked wolves
with high accuracy, a possibility that has not been studied from
the perspective of hunters and trappers, to our knowledge. If
marked and unmarked animals experience differential per capita hazard rates, then marked animals will become less representative of the population as the relative risk of human-caused
mortality increases. Such a relationship could account for the
empirical observations of accelerating declines in wolf population growth as human-caused mortality increases (Adams et al.
2008; Creel and Rotella 2010; Vucetich 2012).
Pending further study, we advise against extrapolation from
data on haphazardly marked animals of any species. Moreover,
one should not discard the lost data from marked animals of
unknown fate as is common in wildlife mortality analyses
(Liberg et al. 2012). We recommend governments and researchers report data on marked and unmarked animals transparently,
including “time on the air” for telemetry data. Additionally,
spatial variation in human density and activity across the range
of marked animals might be useful when poaching is a major
cause of death for study subjects. Together, such steps would
improve estimates of mortality parameters for marked animals
and, consequently, help to avert policy errors.
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poaching. With evidence from 4 endangered wolf populations
in the United States, we showed the miscalculation biased
estimates substantially upwards for legal killing and biased
them substantially downwards for other human causes (mainly
poaching and vehicle collisions; Fig. 3 and Supplementary
Data SD3). The error is non-random (systematic bias) and will
increase under several common conditions: high rates of legal
killing (Fig. 1B), high proportions of unknown fates (Fig. 2A),
and high rates of cryptic poaching (i.e., unreported killing associated with destruction of evidence; Fig. 2B).
The corrections we applied, under even the most conservative equal apportionment approach, yielded estimates indicating
that unregulated human-caused mortality was the major cause
of death in endangered wolf populations in the United States
(Supplementary Data SD3). Observed poaching in all the populations we studied outnumbered the primary other human cause
of death, vehicle collisions, by a factor of 2 or more. That means
most of the underestimation of other human causes was due to
underestimating poaching. When we corrected the bias, we found
substantial underestimates of poaching (Fig. 3). Indeed, for every
wolf population we examined, we found poaching was the greatest
threat. In the NRM wolf populations from 1982 to 2004, poaching
replaced legal killing as the major threat to wolves after correcting for the mathematical miscalculation of legal killing. For the
other wolf populations, the official reports had correctly identified
poaching as the major threat, although they underestimated it.
There are several reasons our estimates of poaching are
higher than previous ones. First, we demonstrated that prior
estimates would have underestimated causes of death that are
not perfectly documented. Second, we took 2 approaches to
reconstruct the unknown fates of radiocollared wolves. The first
approach, equal apportionment, assumes unmonitored wolves
die of the same fates at the same rates as monitored wolves.
This is unlikely to hold in any population of marked animals,
let alone controversial ones such as wolves that are subject to
high relative risks of legal and illegal killing. As such, the equal
apportionment approach should be seen as a minimum bound
on estimates of the risk of mortality from poaching. By contrast, we provided maximum bounds on the estimated risk of
mortality from poaching, when we used the cryptic poaching
approach, which apportions unknown fates to cryptic poaching first, informed by prior estimates of cryptic poaching from
the literature. We used 2 published values for cryptic poaching
from the literature (50% and 66%) and found the higher one
probably too high (Table 3 footnote d). Accordingly, we recommend the 50% cryptic poaching estimate be used as the median
for the likely range of values to estimate the risk of wolf mortality from poaching. These values and approaches may need
adjustment for other sites and other species.
The traditional assumption that the causes of death in individuals of known fate are representative of those of unknown
fate is inaccurate whenever known fates include both perfectly
documented and inaccurately documented causes of death. The
bias increases in proportion to the number of legal kills and the
number of unknown fates because each one adds additional bias
(overrepresenting perfectly documented causes of death and
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Supplementary Data SD1.—Disappearances of marked
animals.
Supplementary Data SD2.—Data for calculations in Tables 2
and 3, and Supplementary Data SD3.
Supplementary Data SD3.—Revised estimates of risk for
each category of cause of death in endangered wolf populations
in the United States.

Submitted 16 January 2017. Accepted 6 April 2017.
Associate Editor was Bill Zielinski.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jmammal/article-abstract/98/5/1256/3798516 by guest on 20 December 2018

Literature Cited
Adams, L. G., R. O. Stephenson, B. W. Dale, R. T. Ahgook, and
D. J. Demma. 2008. Population dynamics and harvest characteristics of wolves in the Central Brooks Range, Alaska. Wildlife
Monographs 170:1–25.
Bangs, E. E., and S. H. Fritts. 1996. Reintroducing the gray wolf
to central Idaho and Yellowstone National Park. Wildlife Society
Bulletin 24:402–413.
Borg, B. L., et al. 2016. Implications of harvest on the boundaries
of protected areas for large carnivore viewing opportunities. PLoS
One 11:e0153808.
Creel, S., and J. J. Rotella. 2010. Meta-analysis of relationships
between human offtake, total mortality and population dynamics
of gray wolves (Canis lupus). PLoS One 5:1–7.
Liberg, O., G. Chapron, P. Wabakken, H. C. Pedersen, N. T. Hobbs,
and H. K. Sand. 2012. Shoot, shovel and shut up: cryptic poaching
slows restoration of a large carnivore in Europe. Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London, B. Biological Sciences 270:91–98.
McLellan, B. N., et al. 1999. Rates and causes of grizzly bear
mortality in the Interior Mountains of British Columbia, Alberta,
Montana, Washington, and Idaho. Journal of Wildlife Management
63:911–920.
Murray, D. L., G. Bastille-Rousseau, J. R. Adams, and L. P. Waits.
2015. The challenges of rRed wolf conservation and the fate of
an endangered species recovery program. Conservation Letters
8:338–344.
Murray, D. L., et al. 2010. Death from anthropogenic causes is
partially compensatory in recovering wolf populations. Biological
Conservation 143:2514–2524.
Natural Resources Board. 2012. Adoption of Board Order
WM-09012(E) relating to wolf hunting and trapping regulations,
establishment of a depredation program, and approval of a harvest
quota and permit level (Natural Resources Board, ed.). Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources, Madison.
Newcomer, E., M. Palladini, and L. Jones. 2011. The Endangered
Species Act v. the United States Department of Justice: how the
Department of Justice derailed criminal prosecutions under the
Endangered Species Act. Animal Law 17:241–271.

Schmidt, J. H., D. S. Johnson, M. S. Lindberg, and L. G. Adams.
2015. Estimating demographic parameters using a combination of
known-fate and open N-mixture models. Ecology 56:2583–2589.
Siminski, P. 2016. Mexican Wolf Canis lupus baileyi International
Studbook. The Living Desert, Palm Desert, California.
Smith, D. W., et al. 2010. Survival of colonizing wolves in the
Northern Rocky Mountains of the United States, 1982–2004.
Journal of Wildlife Management 74:620–634.
Stenglein, J., et al. 2015. Mortality patterns and detection bias from
carcass data: an example from wolf recovery in Wisconsin. Journal
of Wildlife Management 7:1173–1184.
Treves, A., et al. 2017a. Estimating poaching opportunity and potential. Pp. 197–212 in Conservation criminology (M. L. Gore, ed.).
John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Treves, A., J. A. Langenberg, J. V. López-Bao, and M. F. Rabenhorst.
2017b. Gray wolf mortality patterns in Wisconsin from 1979 to
2012. Journal of Mammalogy 98:17–32.
Treves, A., and K. A. Martin. 2011. Hunters as stewards of wolves in
Wisconsin and the Northern Rocky Mountains, USA. Society and
Natural Resources 24:984–994.
Treves, A., L. Naughton-Treves, and V. S. Shelley. 2013.
Longitudinal analysis of attitudes toward wolves. Conservation
Biology 27:315–323.
USFWS. 2007. Red Wolf (Canis rufus) 5-year status review: summary and evaluation. https://ecos.fws.gov/docs/five_year_review/
doc3991.pdf. Accessed 5 March 2017.
USFWS. 2015. Mexican Wolf Recovery Program: progress report
#17. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
USFWS. 2016a. 2015 Mexican Wolf Population Survey reveals more
work to be done but strategy remains viable. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
USFWS. 2016b. Mexican Wolf Experimental Population Area
(MWEPA) Monthly Project Updates September 2016. U.S. FIsh &
Wildlife Service, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
USFWS. 2016c. Mexican Wolf Recovery Area Statistics. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
USFWS. 2016d. Outcomes of Mexican wolf management removals from the Mexican Wolf Recovery Area Populationa, Arizona
and New Mexico, 1998–2015). U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Vucetich, J. A. 2012. Appendix: the influence of anthropogenic mortality on wolf population dynamics with special reference to Creel
and Rotella (2010) and Gude et al. (2011) in the Final peer review
of four documents amending and clarifying the Wyoming gray
wolf management plan. Congressional Federal Register 50:78–95.

